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Introduction  
One of the many ironies in the history of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, as 
named by Winston Churchill in his iconic Fulton speech, was that in little more than 18 
months after his retirement as Prime Minister in April 1955 the Conservative Government of 
which he had been the head for almost four years was involved in the disastrous Suez 
episode – considered by many historians to have been the lowest point in Anglo-American 
relations from the end of the Second World War down to the present day. The responsibility 
for this debacle on the British side is usually allocated to Churchill’s successor, Anthony 
Eden, and to a lesser degree his Cabinet, but what of Churchill himself and of Sir Roger 
Makins, the British ambassador to Washington at the time of Suez, appointed by Churchill 
on the recommendation of Eden? To what extent were Makins and his predecessors 
successful in establishing the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ so desired by Churchill 
and why did this relationship break down during the Suez crisis? 1 
The current essay has three main aims. Firstly, to analyse Churchill’s concept of an Anglo-
American ’special relationship’ as set out in the Fulton speech and the reaction to it in the 
United States,  especially the criticism, put forward by Walter Lippmann amongst others,  
that British colonialism was a significant constraint upon an openly close relationship with 
the US. Secondly, to evaluate the political debate within the US on the Fulton speech that 
continued for several years after it was delivered. The public diplomacy of the British 
ambassadors who served in Washington in the wake of the Fulton speech forms the bulk of 
this section. Finally, to examine what has been called ‘the descent to Suez’, focusing mainly 
on the period from Churchill’s retirement in April 1955, and the extent to which the Suez 
crisis can be linked to the flaws in Churchill’s Fulton vision, notwithstanding the best efforts 
of Makins and his predecessors to maintain a close Anglo-American relationship.  
 ‘The natural term of an Ambassador’s mission should be six years’, Churchill wrote in 1944, 
‘unless he is guilty of incompetence or divergence from the Government’s policy, when of 
course he cannot be recalled too soon’. 2 In the light of this statement it is not surprising 
that of the five ambassadors to the US who held office in the period from Churchill’s 
accession to the premiership in May 1940 to his retirement 15 years later in April 1955 the 
longest serving was his wartime appointment, Edward Wood, Earl of Halifax (1940-46) who 
stayed in Washington for over five years and was still there when Churchill delivered his 
Fulton speech in February 1946. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that his one peacetime 
appointment as ambassador to Washington, Sir Roger Makins, later 1st Baron Sherfield, 
served only three and a half years and was recalled by Eden on the eve of what proved to be 
the climax of the Suez crisis. 
Halifax succeeded Philip Kerr, Lord Lothian, appointed by Neville Chamberlain from August 
1939 but chiefly remembered for his contribution to Anglo-American relations after 
Churchill became Prime Minister. In between Halifax and Makins there were two 
ambassadors appointed during the Labour government of Clement Attlee – Archibald Clark 
Kerr, Lord Inverchapel, and Sir Oliver Franks. In a very real sense these five men were all 
‘Churchill’s ambassadors’, as although Churchill was responsible for the appointment of only 
two of them they all served in the shadow of his wartime leadership and the establishment 
of what he termed the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States. This 
essay has benefitted from some excellent scholarship on all five ambassadors but it takes a 
different approach from earlier works by viewing them primarily in terms of their public 
diplomacy and focusing on the legacy of British colonialism after the Fulton speech, 
especially in relation to the Middle East, and the pitfalls for the Anglo-American relationship 
created by this legacy, culminating in the Suez Crisis in late 1956.  3 
Lord Lothian – Liberal imperialist, 1939-41 
The significance of the United States and of the role of the ambassador in Washington to 
the successful operation of British foreign policy from 1940 can hardly be overstated. 
Following the fall of France in June 1940 there was no more important ally for Britain than 
the United States – but the nature of a British alliance with the US both then and 
subsequently was a matter of great sensitivity, especially on the American side of the 
Atlantic.  Public opinion in the US was divided on the issue and suspicious of anything 
resembling British propaganda.  Sir Ronald Lindsay, British ambassador in Washington from 
1930 to 1939, was therefore reluctant to engage in public diplomacy which he feared could 
be construed as official propaganda and might lead to a backlash in US public opinion.  4 
But Lothian, in different circumstances and with a more gregarious personality than the 
taciturn Lindsay, was determined to win over American public opinion to the British cause 
and therefore placed much greater emphasis on public diplomacy than hitherto – a 
significant legacy for all of his successors. Indeed, his easy charm and gift for public 
relations, combined with his knowledge of the US where he was a frequent visitor in the 
1930s, were Lothian’s strongest assets when taking up the post of ambassador. Both of 
these factors helped him to overcome his earlier reputation as an ‘appeaser’ and critic of 
Churchill’s warnings against the rise of Nazi Germany. Lothian was also a ‘Liberal Imperialist’ 
who had been a member of Lord Milner’s ‘Kindergarten’ group of colonial civil servants in 
South Africa before the First World War and then Private Secretary to Lloyd George during 
the war. He served briefly as Under Secretary of State for India in 1931-32 and was a Liberal 
member of the House of Lords in the 1930s.5   
In October 1939, soon after taking up his Washington role, Lothian gave a significant 
address to the Pilgrims Society in New York – a traditional rite of passage for any new British 
ambassador. As well as speaking to an influential audience of the ‘great and the good’ from 
American government and civil society the Pilgrims address was invariably reported at some 
length in the major newspapers, especially the New York Times. In his speech Lothian 
tackled the issue of ‘British propaganda’ head on by saying he had been warned not to 
discuss the war but he felt that Britain had the right to explain its point of view to the United 
States and to other democracies. It was then the ‘inalienable right’ of Americans to make up 
their own mind. He suggested that Britain had no use for propaganda in the US because, as 
a democracy, it was content to let the facts speak for themselves. Whereas, he argued, the 
role of propaganda in the totalitarian states was entirely different. He accepted that Britain 
deserved its share of the blame for the outbreak of war but he said that Hitler’s essential 
aim was to revise not just the Versailles Treaty but ‘the whole democratic conception of 
international life’. 6 
Lothian also addressed the issue of British imperialism which, he conceded,  might be seen 
as undermining Britain’s democratic credentials. He referred throughout his speech to the 
British Commonwealth rather than the Empire and said that, in its modern form, it was 
‘something quite different from what most Americans believe’. It was no longer an empire 
‘in the old sense of the word’, he said, but rather ‘a vast system of international 
relationships, containing nearly 450,000,000 people, of many different races, religions and 
colours, yet living together under conditions of order and with ever increasing freedom and 
responsibility’. It had its fair share of problems, he acknowledged, not least in India. But 
Mahatma Gandhi had come out in favour of the Allied cause as had the independent 
Dominions like Canada and the representatives of the British colonies. This demonstrated, 
he argued, ‘the immense gulf between British Imperialism, as it is sometimes called, and the 
imperialism of the totalitarian world’. 7 
It was fortunate indeed for Lothian’s reputation as a highly effective ambassador and for 
Britain’s war effort that the White House was at that time occupied by Franklin Roosevelt 
who judged it to be in American interests to supply Britain with ‘all aid short of war’. But 
with FDR’s death in April 1945 the case for a supportive US relationship towards Britain had 
to be made again – first of all with FDR’s successor and fellow Democrat, Harry Truman, and 
later with Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander at the end of the war in 
Europe and by 1953 a Republican President – the first for twenty years.  Although American 
isolationism was much less in evidence after the war than before there remained a residual 
suspicion of British foreign policy and especially of British colonialism. The case for a close 
Anglo-American relationship therefore had to be made again and again – a task that 
Churchill took on in his Fulton address. 8  
Churchill’s Fulton vision, 5 March 1946  
Churchill’s speech at Fulton on 5 March 1946 was delivered against the background of 
growing concern, both in the US and Britain, about post-war policy disagreements between 
the Western powers and the Soviet Union. These disagreements had been especially 
evident during the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, after which several US 
spokesmen had made it clear that reaching agreement on post-war problems would not be 
an easy matter. John Foster Dulles, at this time Chief Adviser to James Byrnes, the US 
Secretary of State, gave a radio address  on the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 
London in September 1945 and the differences of opinion between the US and Britain on 
the one side and the Soviet Union on the other. Senator Arthur Vandenberg appealed for 
the lifting of what he called the ‘iron curtain’ of secrecy between the US and the Soviet 
Union.  Byrnes himself took to the airwaves at the end of December, detailing particular 
disagreements over Romania, Bulgaria, Iran and Korea. Such concerns were magnified by 
Stalin’s speech in Moscow on 9 February 1946 that seemed to suggest that the Soviet 
leadership anticipated future trials of strength with the western powers. George Kennan’s 
‘Long Telegram’, sent on 22 Feb 1946, resulted from these growing concerns in the West. 9 
In many ways Churchill ‘s Fulton speech was responding to the same set of circumstances as 
Kennan although his remedies were public rather than private and they focused primarily on 
the Anglo-American relationship rather than on the US alone. Churchill certainly 
acknowledged the primacy of the United States in the post-war order and identified its 
mission as protecting the world from ‘tyranny and war’. He alluded to the importance of the 
United Nations in ensuring world peace and to the desirability that states should have free 
elections and democratic principles. He then stressed the need to continue the ‘special 
relationship’ between the US and the British Empire that had  come to fruition during the 
Second World War before highlighting the threat posed by the rapid division of Europe into 
two halves – the one democratic in outlook, the other Communist  – divided by an Iron 
Curtain. Only by continuing the close wartime cooperation between the US and the British 
Empire, he concluded, could the United Nations Organisation be successful and the threat of 
another world war avoided. 10 
American reactions to Fulton – the colonial issue  
Churchill’s speech was in many ways a brilliant argument for the continuation of the 
wartime Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, linked as it was to the need to ‘contain’ 
Soviet power. And because of his prestige and the robust language that he employed the 
speech naturally attracted enormous attention both inside and outside the United States. 
Moreover, it raised in an acute form a number of major issues confronting the Truman 
Administration, not least the question mark hanging over US relations with the Soviet 
Union. The reaction to the speech was bound to be significant and it fell to Lord Halifax, 
appointed by Churchill after the untimely death of Lord Lothian in December 1940, to report 
the details of this reaction to the British Foreign Office and thereby to the Attlee 
Government that had succeeded Churchill’s wartime coalition in June 1945. 11 
Referring to Churchill’s criticisms of Soviet policy and use of the term ‘Iron Curtain’, Halifax’s 
report – most likely drafted by Isaiah Berlin who was a member of the Embassy at this time - 
compared Churchill to ‘a dentist who has diagnosed a severe inflammation and proposes 
the use of the drill, which may have to be followed by actual extraction of the diseased 
tooth. All but the Left-wing journalists and politicians concede that there is something 
wrong with the tooth in question; some are inclined to suspect that the condition may be 
grave indeed; but almost all shy with real or simulated horror from the idea of the drill and 
complain that the dentist is notorious for his love of drastic remedies, and that surely 
modern medicine has provided more painless methods of cure, and that so brutal a method 
as that recommended by Mr Churchill harks back to rough old-fashioned practices’. 12 
As regards the media, the ambassador’s report continued: ‘Leftwing press and radio (i.e. the 
majority of broadcasters) denounces the speech as war-mongering, imperialistic, the call to 
a new anti-Comintern pact, justifying the worst Russian suspicions, etc but even these 
quarters are compelled to qualify their abuses by conceding Mr Churchill’s past services and 
complaining that it is the “bad” Churchill rather than the “good” Churchill who is speaking.’ 
On the other hand ‘more moderate comment is far readier to recognise the disagreeable 
facts forced upon their attention by Mr Churchill but tends to recoil from the drastic remedy 
prescribed, i.e. a close military alliance, etc. This proposal is attacked on the traditional 
grounds of the unpopularity of formal alliance in the United States, refusal to underwrite 
British imperialism, reluctance to be used to pull British chestnuts out of the fire, the “body 
blow” such an alliance would administer to the U.N.O., etc.’ 13 
Halifax’s report thus pointed out the negative reaction to Churchill’s references to the 
British Empire and this was very apparent in both the press and radio coverage of the Fulton 
speech. ‘Does his fraternal military association require the United States to underwrite the 
present British position in Greece, Near East, India, Burma and Malaya?’, asked the Herald 
Tribune. And in order to hold the line against Russian expansion would it give the US any 
role in ‘the development of the seething peoples who now lie on the British side of it?’. (20) 
The more sympathetic Christian Science Monitor accepted that Churchill was aiming for ‘the 
closest possible association of all English-speaking peoples’. But it acknowledged that his 
‘fears of Russian encroachment on the British Empire’s Mediterranean lifeline’ could be 
seen as the reason why he was seeking ‘to inveigle the United States into jointly sharing the 
defence of a decadent empire’. 14  
Criticism of British colonialism was especially prevalent in the newspapers of the Mid West, 
most notably in Chicago – seen as a traditional stronghold of Irish-Americanism and 
isolationism. The Chicago Tribune was, of course, well known for being critical of British 
imperialism while the Chicago Sun argued that to follow Churchill’s advice would lead to 
another world war. He had attacked Russian expansion ‘while remaining silent on British 
imperialism’ and he had used the Bible ‘to justify the system of alliances dominated by a 
master alliance of the Anglo-Saxon Herrenvolk’. Churchill was appealing ‘to an alliance to 
save a privileged imperial world he can’t believe is dead and which would tie America to 
maintaining British outposts in the world against subject peoples struggling to escape the 
yoke’. The Chicago Times said that Churchill was ‘a product of the past who believes in the 
white man’s burden and consequently omitted from his speech what is less appealing to 
America, namely events in India, Indonesia, etc., while striking out against Soviet ambitions 
and tyranny’. 15 
The most incisive critique of the British colonialism that was felt to underlie the Fulton 
speech came from the highly influential journalist and commentator Walter Lippmann. ‘The 
speech itself’, he wrote, ‘will be received in this country as an incomplete statement as 
Churchill, in examining the problem of forming a united British-American front, dwelt only 
on Russian expansion’. According to Lippmann ‘the essence of the problem’ lay in the 
‘obscure and complex relation between the British Commonwealth and the British Empire’. 
He argued that Churchill had failed to face this problem and had assumed that his American 
audience would also fail to face it. Churchill, he continued, had suggested that the 
permanent defence arrangement between the US and Canada could act as a model for an 
arrangement between the US and all of the British Dominions but in practice this would 
mean establishing a permanent defence arrangement ‘with the United Kingdom and the 
dependent empire which it governs’. 16 
The central dilemma for the US, Lippmann argued, concerned those countries under British 
rule or British influence that were not English-speaking and did not have any inheritance of 
freedom. In this case, a united front with the British Empire would be regarded in the US as 
‘an unattractive, unwise and ineffective policy’ that could ‘weaken and not strengthen the 
western world in the contest of influence with the Soviet Union’ because ‘in a united front 
against Russia in Asia, the United States would be incapable of differentiating its own 
position from that of the European empires in Asia’.  It was ‘precisely because the United 
States is neither a totalitarian state nor a colonial power’, he said, ‘that it can hope to retain 
influence in keeping the Asiatic peoples in good relations with the western world’. Lippmann  
concluded that ‘the United States cannot in the interests of civilisation lose its own identity 
in Asia by merging itself with the British Empire but must retain its separate influence’. The 
‘deficiencies of British power’ could not be made up entirely by the United States, he added 
and, ironically in view of the later Suez crisis, he suggested that Britain would have to 
rebuild its relationship with France if it wished to shore up its power and protect its empire. 
17 
Thus for Americans like Lippmann the Fulton speech highlighted the spectre of British 
colonialism and Churchill’s image as a die-hard imperialist. Whereas Churchill was not 
embarrassed to refer to the Empire in his speech and lauded its size and strength and its 
contribution to the Allied victory during the war there was a strong element in US public 
opinion that was uneasy – if not downright hostile – at the notion of US support for British 
colonialism. This had been true of Franklin Roosevelt, especially with regard to India, and it 
was one of the issues that he referred to when he was seeking support from Stalin at Yalta.   
It was also one of the reasons why an open Anglo-American relationship – rather than the 
tacit understanding favoured by FDR before June 1940 – was such a sensitive issue in the 
US. From the American perspective the three variants of British colonialism - the 
Commonwealth (comprising the independent Dominions), the colonial empire, and the 
informal empire in the Middle East (symbolised by control of Iran’s oil and the Suez Canal in 
Egypt) were all represented by Churchill and his Fulton speech. 18  
 
Fulton revisited - Churchill’s Waldorf-Astoria speech, 15 March 1946  
Churchill’s Fulton speech thus resulted in an intense debate in the US on its various 
contentions, not least the idea of an Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. To some extent it 
was a renewal of the ‘great debate’ that had raged in 1940-41 over whether the US should 
intervene on behalf of Britain following the fall of France. Nor was the controversy confined 
to American shores. Churchill’s speech was the subject of an uncomfortable discussion in 
the British Cabinet following suggestions in both the US and Russia that the British 
Government had been consulted in advance and had approved of Churchill’s speech. British 
Information Services in New York and the Ministry of Information in London had both 
helped to distribute advance copies of the speech to the press although ministers had not 
themselves seen it.  Attlee told the Cabinet that he would make it quite clear to the House 
of Commons that the Government had no knowledge of the contents of the Fulton speech 
before it was delivered. 19    
Churchill was still in America while the Fulton debate was in full swing and was therefore 
able to observe at first hand the impact of his words. In fact, his schedule during his stay in 
the US included no fewer than half a dozen speeches including one at a dinner in his honour 
on 15 March at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel – traditional venue of ambassadorial addresses to 
the Pilgrims Society.  The occasion was hosted by Governor Thomas Dewey and attended by 
the Mayor of New York, William O’Dwyer. Dean Acheson was expected to be there but was 
conveniently called away on urgent business at the last moment. During the ten days since 
his Fulton speech the international situation had taken a dramatic turn for the worse with 
an appeal by the Iranian Government to the UN in protest at the continued presence of 
Soviet forces in the country. Thus when Churchill came to give his speech, entitled ‘The 
Darkening International Scene’, he was in an unrepentant mood.  20  
Churchill began by alluding to the title of his speech and the problems of the moment. 
‘When I spoke at Fulton ten days ago’, he said, ‘I felt it was necessary for someone in an 
unofficial position to speak in arresting terms about the present plight of the world. I do not 
wish to withdraw or modify a single word’.  He was sure that ‘the hope which I expressed for 
the increasing association of our two countries’ would come to pass eventually, as it was 
bound to do, but the main question was whether this would happen ‘in a sufficiently plain 
and clear manner and in good time to prevent a new world struggle or whether it will come 
about, as it has done before, only in the course of that struggle’. He was confident that it 
would come in time as there was no imminent danger of military conflict and he did not feel 
that ‘the rulers of Russia’ were intent on war. But there was confusion and suspicion about 
their motives, for example in the case of Iran. 21 
As regards the UN, far from being a threat to the success of the new organisation, a close 
relationship between Britain and the US was essential for it to succeed. ‘Unless they work 
together, in full loyalty to the Charter, the organisation of the United Nations will cease to 
have any reality. No one will be able to put his trust in it and the world will be left to the 
clash of nationalisms which have led us to two frightful wars’. He also clarified how he saw 
the ‘special relationship’ in practice. ‘I have never asked for an Anglo-American military 
alliance or a treaty. I asked for something different and in a sense I asked for something 
more. I asked for a free, voluntary, fraternal association’. As he explained, ‘you do not need 
a treaty to express the natural affinities and friendships which arise in a fraternal 
association’. 22  
Churchill wanted this ‘fraternal association’ between Britain and the US to be entirely open 
rather than one that was played down for whatever reason. ‘It would be wrong that the fact 
should be concealed or ignored,’ he said. ‘Nothing can prevent our nations drawing ever 
closer to one another and nothing can obscure the fact that, in their harmonious 
companionship, lies the main hope of a world instrument for maintaining peace on earth 
and goodwill to all men’. Clearly Churchill felt that it was important that potential disturbers 
of the peace should realise at the outset that they would be met by joint action between the 
US and Britain. It was a familiar refrain – and not just by Churchill – that if only Hitler and 
Mussolini had realised that the US would join Britain and its Empire in confronting them 
they would never have launched their expansionist campaigns in Europe. Whether or not 
this was an accurate reading of history it was certainly a logical approach in the wake of the 
Second World War and it was one that eventually informed the policy of containment 
towards the Soviet Union adopted by the Truman Administration. 23 
The North American Department of the Foreign Office felt that Churchill had done a good 
job of clearing the post-Fulton air in his Waldorf-Astoria speech. 24 However, although he 
dealt explicitly with the criticisms of his Fulton speech regarding the UN issue and relations 
with Russia he entirely overlooked - or ignored - the other main criticism of his vision of a 
‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States – that this would involve the US 
in condoning and to some extent supporting the continuation of the British Empire in its 
various forms. Churchill did not mention this issue at all in his speech although, unlike at 
Fulton, he was careful to refer to friendship between the US and ‘the British 
Commonwealth’ rather than the Empire. The only empire he mentioned in his Waldorf-
Astoria speech was the Roman Empire – comparing its ‘majesty and power’ with that of the 
United States. ‘We in the British Commonwealth will stand at your side in powerful and 
faithful friendship, and in accordance with the World Charter’, he concluded, ‘and together I 
am sure we shall succeed in lifting from the face of man the curse of war and the darker 
curse of tyranny’. 25  
Of course, Churchill was the last person to apologise for the British Empire – as he still 
preferred to call the Commonwealth and Empire collectively. Much of his career had been 
spent defending it in both a military and political sense. His opposition to Indian self-
government had helped to keep him out of the National Government in the 1930s and his 
outspokenness on this issue had blunted his early calls for action against the rising power of 
Germany. 26 Churchill’s views on the British Empire at this time were revealed in a private 
speech he made at the University Club in New York a few days after his Waldorf-Astoria 
address. ‘He defended the Empire and its principles with vigour, and was warmly applauded 
for his presentation of its objectives’, reported one informed observer. ‘He deplored Britain 
being ‘’talked out’’ of her rich estate in India...but acknowledged the early need to advance 
India to nationhood. He expressed fear as to India’s future, however, which he regarded as 
obscure: her people might have cause to regret any hasty assumption of the responsibilities 
of nationhood’. 27 
Lord Halifax – Whig grandee, 1941-46 
Edward Wood, Viscount Halifax, was nearing the end of his time as the British ambassador 
in Washington when Churchill delivered his Fulton speech. Halifax had been Viceroy of India 
from 1926 to 1931, a particularly turbulent period in Indian politics. His negotiations with 
Gandhi had received much criticism from Churchill but overall his term of office in India was 
regarded by Stanley Baldwin at least as a success and he had joined the Baldwin 
Government in June 1935. Neville Chamberlain also thought highly of him and when 
Anthony Eden resigned in April 1938 Halifax was appointed Foreign Secretary. In this 
capacity he was largely responsible for the appointment of Lord Lothian as British 
ambassador to succeed Lindsay in August 1939. A contender for the premiership when 
Chamberlain stood down in May 1940, Halifax deferred to Churchill who subsequently 
appointed him as ambassador to the US following Lothian’s death in December 1940. 
Churchill may have been partly motivated by the desire to remove a rival from London but, 
whatever the motives, it proved to be, according to most accounts, a master-stroke. 28 
After an uncertain start Halifax, who had gone to Washington very reluctantly, eventually 
settled into his ambassadorial role. He developed an excellent relationship with Roosevelt 
and his key advisers – helped by the fact that he was a more of a Whig grandee than a Tory. 
He was also fully alive to the demands of public diplomacy and the need to represent Britain 
far and wide across the United States. It was his proud boast by the time he left Washington 
that he had visited all 48 states. 29  As regards the Fulton speech, Halifax’s report to London 
detailed its very mixed reception in the United States. He also had his own private doubts 
about the speech – mainly concerned with the ‘Iron Curtain’ notion which he felt, like many 
US observers, would only make the Soviet Union more difficult to deal with. Interestingly, in 
view of Churchill’s later summit diplomacy, Halifax wrote privately to suggest that Churchill 
should offer to meet Stalin in Moscow to discuss the worsening international situation. But 
Churchill declined this suggestion as likely to be compared to Chamberlain’s trip to Munich 
in September 1938 – not an interpretation that Halifax shared. 30  
Although Halifax had his doubts about the Fulton speech he was not averse to the idea of a 
‘special relationship’ with the US. Indeed, in his farewell speech to the Pilgrims Society in 
April 1946 he rivalled Churchill in his devotion to the Anglo-American ideal. Recalling his 
speech to the Pilgrims in March 1941 as the new British ambassador he pointed out that the 
Battle of Britain was only recently over at that time and most of Europe was still under 
German control. But December 1941 ‘saw the beginning of a collaboration between our two 
countries unique in history’, he continued. ‘Never before, between any two countries in 
war, had there been so complete a unity of military, industrial and political effort. It might 
almost be said that we fought as one people’. He was convinced that if this alliance had 
existed in 1931 then a second world war would have been avoided. The question now was 
whether the mistakes of the past had been learned. ‘Can you and we retain during the years 
of peace the cooperation we learnt and practised during the years of war? To my mind the 
future course of history for your people and mine and perhaps for the world depends upon 
the answer’. 31 
Still echoing Churchill, he said that the United Nations Organisation was ‘the last best hope 
of the world’ but if it was to succeed it had to receive the support of the nations that had 
signed up to it.  The UN would take time to settle in ‘but let our two nations who already 
have so much in common lead the way to this larger understanding, for if we can first win 
when the ground is so plainly with us we shall be that much better placed to win where the 
difficulties are greater and the initial advantages not so apparent’. Then, avoiding any 
mention of the Soviet Union, Halifax said: ‘Such friendship between our two countries is 
inspired by no selfish motive. It is directed against nobody. It is not an end, but a beginning. 
It has no other object than to strengthen and reinforce the will and work of the Organisation 
to which our loyalty is pledged.’ In short, he said, the Anglo-American relationship could and 
should be ‘the rock upon which our House of Peace is built’. 32 
Halifax then drew up a balance sheet of similarities and differences in terms of language, 
history, temperament, tradition and race.  The most important factor, he said, was the 
‘priceless inheritance of common thought’ based on a desire for freedom.  This ensured that 
Britain and the US always came together on big issues even though they might differ on 
smaller ones. However, one area did concern him. ‘I must confess’ he said, ‘that I have 
frequently deplored the extent to which the attitude of many of your people towards the 
British Commonwealth and Empire was affected by a tradition which leads them to be 
unaware of the changes of such magnitude that have taken place over the last hundred and 
fifty years and obscures the fact that the Commonwealth and Empire of King George VI is 
something very different from the Colonial Empire of King George III’. Certainly, he felt, this 
issue should not get in the way of friendly relations between the two countries and that 
they should ‘go forward into the years of peace in that same comradeship which it was our 
salvation to find in war’. But it is significant that he raised the issue of Britain’s adverse 
colonial image in his farewell address. 33  
Lord Inverchapel – eccentric Progressive, 1946-48  
Halifax departed the USA in May 1946. Thus it was his successor, Archibald Clark Kerr – 
newly ennobled as Lord Inverchapel - who took over the reins in Washington during the 
years that followed the Fulton speech and witnessed the onset of the Cold War.  
Inverchapel had enjoyed a distinguished diplomatic career. He had served in Washington 
under Lord Bryce before the First World War and then in the Middle East, including Egypt, 
after the War. He had also been the British ambassador to Chile (1928-30), where he 
married the daughter of a Chilean aristocrat who was almost 30 years his junior. Further 
posts followed in Sweden (1930-34), Iraq (1935-38), China (1938-42) and the Soviet Union 
(1942-46). In all of these postings his leftish sympathies served him well and he was 
generally regarded as a success. 34 
He was perhaps less well-suited to Washington, where he was sent by the new Labour 
Government,  as he was not keen on the social side of the ambassador’s role, was not very 
strong on economics and was also rather eccentric in some of his ways – for example, he 
preferred to use a quill pen and disliked the telephone. He also divorced and re-married his 
Chilean partner while serving in Washington. He was obviously not a Churchill appointment 
and his views on the British Empire were much more progressive than those of the former 
Prime Minister. Partly for this reason, he played a significant role in trying to nullify 
American criticism of British colonialism in the wake of the Fulton speech and he at least 
realised that it was an issue that needed to be addressed. 35  
In fact, the issue was again brought to the fore in September 1946 in a speech given by 
FDR’s former Vice President, Henry Wallace, that was to some extent a rebuttal of 
Churchill’s Fulton address six months earlier. Wallace’s speech led to his dismissal by 
Truman and opened up a serious split in the Democratic party at the time of the 1946 mid-
term elections. To say that it created something of a political and diplomatic sensation 
would be putting it mildly and the fall-out from it was Inverchapel’s main focus for at least a 
month as London sought to assess its significance for Anglo-American relations. ‘Certainly 
we like the British people as individuals’, Wallace had said. ‘But to make Britain the key to 
our foreign policy would be, in my opinion, the height of folly....Make no mistake about it—
the British imperialistic policy in the Near East alone, combined with Russian retaliation, 
would lead the United States straight to war unless we have a clearly-defined and realistic 
policy of our own’. 36  
It was in the wake of Wallace’s speech and the disastrous showing of the Democrats in the 
1946 mid-term elections that Inverchapel addressed the Pilgrim’s Society in New York in 
November 1946. Unlike Churchill – and, indeed, unlike Halifax in his speech to the Pilgrims – 
Inverchapel took on the issue of British colonialism in a way that was most likely to win US 
support. No doubt this was because he was representing a Labour Government and took a 
more liberal view of the Empire than Churchill tended to do. Indeed, he made much of ‘the 
liberal tradition’ that he said the US and Britain had in common. Liberal ideas were ‘more 
deeply rooted and more tenaciously held than ever before by our two peoples for the 
reason that together we have been through the fire’, he said. The ‘perils of 1940’ had 
strengthened the British national character which, he felt, had ‘almost everything in 
common’ with the American. Both were peace-loving and slow to respond to trouble but 
both were decisive when eventually forced to act. 37  
Inverchapel then began a measured defence of the British Empire. ‘Critics chide us for being 
imperialists and oppressors of backward races’, he said. But the British Commonwealth of 
Nations was in reality ‘an association of widely scattered sovereign states united only by the 
common spirit of liberal institutions under one crown’. Indeed, he said, ‘this Commonwealth 
is the first example of a United Nations organisation. Each part of it is willing to forgo some 
of its sovereign rights for the common good’. The Statute of Westminster had put the 
Dominions on an equal footing with Britain ‘but no legal compulsion would ever keep such 
an organisation as the British Commonwealth together. That was proved in 1776’. In fact, 
‘our Commonwealth exists in virtue of a belief in the essentials of liberty and respect for the 
dignity of man. So long as we hold fast to these values, we shall remain together. We hold 
them more strongly now than ever before, and let no man’s wisdom tell him that we are a 
weaker force in the world than hitherto’. 38  
Great progress had also been made in the development of the colonial empire which had 
been inherited from the old days of imperialism that had ended in the 19th century’, he said. 
‘It has been scowled at in many quarters, not least in Great Britain’, he added, by statesmen 
such as Gladstone. But the colonies were now seen as trusteeships rather than as territories 
to be exploited by Britain. Great strides had already been made towards parliamentary 
government in places such as Nigeria. Looking to the future, the goal was to transform the 
British Empire from being half Commonwealth and half Empire into ‘one great, free 
association of peoples, Anglo-Saxons, Asiatics, Africans and Polynesians. We see these 
nations as equal members of a partnership called the British Commonwealth’ subscribing ‘to 
the ideas of liberty and human dignity’ and joining other nations at the UN. It would be 
some time before that horizon was reached, he said, but much progress had already been 
made. 39  
It was a well crafted speech that addressed two aspects of Britain’s colonial past – the 
nature of the Commonwealth and the status of the colonial empire. It was an unashamedly 
positive gloss on the Empire that played down its considerable economic benefits. But even 
Inverchapel in this speech to a sympathetic audience did not tackle the issue of Britain’s 
informal empire in the Middle East, highlighted by Henry Wallace amongst others. The 
Middle East remained a major issue during Inverchapel’s time as ambassador, especially the 
future of Palestine and the UN mandate held by Britain, about which London and 
Washington had serious disagreements that were hardly lessened by Truman’s decision to 
recognise Israel as soon as the UN mandate ended on 14 May 1948. Inverchapel returned to 
London two weeks later, declaring that the Washington role had been ‘a very tough job’ but 
that there had been ‘a tremendous improvement’ in Anglo-American relations during his 
two years in the United States. 40   
Sir Oliver Franks – ‘Philosopher Ambassador’, 1948-52   
In February 1948 it was announced that Inverchapel was to be replaced by Sir Oliver Franks, 
an Oxford professor, economics expert and leading contributor to the implementation of 
the Marshall Plan. Franks enjoyed a very high reputation. He had excelled as a student at 
Oxford and was appointed a Fellow at Queen’s College before taking up the post of 
Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1937. With the outbreak of 
war he joined the Ministry of Supply in London, becoming Permanent Secretary by the end 
of the war. He then became Provost of Queen’s College before returning to government in 
July 1947 as chairman of the British committee on Marshall Aid, playing a significant role in 
producing a united European response. He was a tall and impressive figure who quickly 
formed good personal relations with Truman and his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. His 
first months in Washington saw the introduction of the Marshall Aid plan and the onset of 
the Berlin Blockade.  41 
In June 1948 Franks gave his first speech as ambassador to the National Press Club in 
Washington. Britain’s Palestinian mandate was the main focus. Franks admitted that Britain 
had made mistakes but he deplored any accusations of bad faith. He felt that neither Britain 
nor the US had really understood the other’s point of view. Both countries wanted a stable 
Middle East so there was common ground to build upon. More generally, he questioned 
whether it was helpful to see Anglo-American relations in such simple terms as ‘Great 
Britain was an old country and the United States was a new country; that Britons were 
traditionalists and Americans were not’. He questioned whether the US was a young country 
in all respects. ‘I wonder whether the American way of life is not itself a great achievement, 
something that has ripened’, he said. As for Britain, ‘we do not feel we live in just an old 
country’. Britain was ‘not a country burdened with tradition, but a country seething with 
ideas’, he argued. ‘The controversy and debate would go on’, he said, because ‘we are living 
in a country that is very much alive’. 42 
Franks spoke in a similar vein when he delivered the traditional speech to the Pilgrims 
Society in New York in October 1948. He began by acknowledging that Britain’s economic 
situation made it difficult to play as full a role in European affairs as the US might like. 
However, Britain had been active in diplomacy, the airlift to Berlin and economic aid to 
Western Europe as well as the continued development of the British Commonwealth. 
Echoing Churchill’s praise of Lend Lease he said that the generosity and imagination of the 
Marshall Aid programme was ‘unexampled in the history of the world’. As for the Anglo-
American relationship, it had continued after the war as ‘a kind of working partnership 
between us in the effort to deal with the many difficulties and dangers that beset us and the 
world’. The two countries did not always agree at first and differences often arose, but they 
were worked out ‘because of our unity in the basic things of human living’. Between them, 
he declared, Britain and the United States were making ‘a supreme endeavour to save the 
sanity of the world’. 43  
It was speeches like these two that were to earn for Franks the title of ‘Philosopher 
Ambassador’ from the New York Times. 44 Indeed, Franks needed to be philosophical as his 
time as ambassador was marked by a series of momentous events in Europe and Asia, all of 
which impacted upon the Anglo-American relationship  – the formation of NATO; the end of 
the Berlin blockade and the establishment of West and East Germany as separate states; the 
successful testing of a Soviet atom bomb; the Chinese revolution of October 1949 that 
brought the Communists to power and saw the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan – a 
development that led to differences between the US and Britain  over the latter’s 
recognition of Communist China; the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the 
subsequent Chinese intervention;  growing concern over General MacArthur’s conduct of 
the war and the threat to use atomic weapons that saw Attlee’s hurried visit to Washington 
in December 1950; the controversial dismissal of MacArthur in April 1951; and, last but not 
least, the rise of McCarthyism, with its unfortunate effect on American domestic politics and 
diplomacy. 45 
Throughout this period Anglo-American relations were aided by the close relationship 
between Franks and Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State. Acheson was generally 
sympathetic to Britain as a loyal ally and privately he acknowledged that there was a special 
bond between the two countries because of their ‘common language and history’. But he 
was opposed to the use of the term ‘special relationship’ in public, especially by the State 
Department, as likely to ‘increase suspicion among our allies of secret plans and purposes 
which they did not share and would not approve’. It would also confirm to ’the Mayor 
Thompsons, McCarthys, McCarrans, and Jenners’ that ‘the State Department was a tool of a 
foreign power’. As he pointed out, ‘Mayor Thompson of Chicago had found the key to 
success at the polls in his proclaimed eagerness to ‘’hit King George on the snout’’’. And 
before Pearl Harbour, ‘Communists and ‘’America Firsters’’ had joined in condemning 
Britain’s ‘’imperialist’’ war’. So it was important not to provide such groups with any 
ammunition that would hamper Anglo-American relations. 46  
When Franks returned to London in March 1951 for consultations with Sir Roger Makins and 
other Foreign Office personnel there was evident concern – as there was in Churchill’s 
Fulton and Waldorf-Astoria speeches – that the US government preferred a covert ‘special 
relationship’ to an open one. The reasons for the American attitude were not referred to in 
the record of the meeting but no doubt included sensitivity towards other allies such as 
France and various policy differences with Britain. But judging from Acheson’s comments 
Britain’s enduring colonialist image was also an important factor and it was no coincidence 
that he had specifically mentioned Chicago and various Irish-American politicians as sources 
of criticism of a public Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. Furthermore, as Lippmann had 
pointed out after the Fulton speech, too open an association with the British Empire might 
hamper American efforts to win over the hearts and minds of people in the Third World.  47  
The divergence between British and US policies in the Middle East, amply demonstrated in 
the case of Palestine, was again in evidence during the Abadan crisis of September 1951. 
Like the Suez crisis several years later it followed the nationalisation of a valuable British 
asset by a nationalist leader – in this case the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mossadeq on 2 May 1951. Not for the first time, or the last, a British 
ambassador in Washington was caught in the middle of a delicate issue arising in the Middle 
East. Franks was critical of the British-controlled company which, he said, ‘had not got far 
enough past the stage of Victorian paternalism’ and he pointed out that the ‘Kipling type of 
technique’ was unlikely to win over the Truman Administration. Indeed, Acheson made it 
very clear to Franks that the US could not support military action. On 25 September the 
Iranian government announced that British technicians who refused to work for the new 
National Iranian Oil Company would be given a week to leave the country.  On the 27th the 
British Cabinet seriously discussed the use of force but the American opposition to such a 
move persuaded Attlee and his ministers that this was not a sensible option. A week later 
the British employees left Abadan and the crisis was over. 48 
A general election at the end of October 1951 saw the return of Winston Churchill as Prime 
Minister – one month short of his 77th birthday – and of Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary. 
Franks enjoyed good relations with both but he was a less influential figure for the 
remainder of his time as ambassador as Churchill naturally regarded himself as the leading 
authority on Anglo-American relations and Eden was not far behind in valuing his own 
opinion most highly. 49 Churchill was anxious to re-establish contact with Truman and in 
January 1952 he was once more in Washington. He held several talks with the President and 
his key officials and it was clear that confirming the ‘special relationship’ was uppermost in 
his mind, if not in Truman’s. However, the main event of the visit was Churchill’s address to 
Congress on 17 January in which he declared that: ‘Under the pressure and menace of 
Communist aggression the fraternal association of the United States with Britain and the 
British Commonwealth, and the new unity growing up in Europe...are being brought 
forward, perhaps by several generations, in the destiny of the world’. 50 
This was obviously a veiled reference to his Fulton speech but, unlike at Fulton, Churchill 
also dwelt in some detail upon the Middle East – a sign of its central importance to his 
Government.  He was full of praise for Israel and pointed out that he had supported a 
national home for the Jews since the days of the Balfour Declaration. But his main focus was 
the Suez Canal. He told Congress that it was ‘no longer possible’ for Britain ‘to bear the 
whole burden of maintaining the freedom of the famous waterway of the Suez Canal’. This 
task had become ‘an international rather than a national responsibility’. There were more 
than 80,000 British troops in the Canal Zone and this commitment could not be borne for 
much longer. He appealed for support from the US, France and Turkey and said that even 
token reinforcements would have a stabilising effect and would help to end ‘the wide 
disorders of the Middle East in which...there lurk dangers not less great than those which 
the United States has stemmed in Korea’. It was a classic piece of Churchillian oratory – the 
Middle East had received the Fulton treatment. 51     
Franks’ term in Washington was due to expire in June 1952 but he agreed to stay on until 
December. Before he departed from the US he gave another speech at the National Press 
Club in which he declared that US-British friendship was the foundation for the world’s 
hopes of freedom and that despite their differences and disagreements, should it come to 
‘the pinch and to the clinch’ the two countries were as one.  52 He continued with this theme 
in a farewell speech delivered on the radio the next day. The main danger to cordial Anglo-
American relations, he argued, was ‘the unreasoning passion of a purely nationalistic 
approach’.  Differences in temperament and outlook gave the Anglo-American partnership 
its ‘strength and vitality’.  But ‘we should be alert to prejudices which blind us to the 
realities of the matter and the too-stubborn desire to follow our individual paths. These are 
the foes of the unity we must maintain if we are to survive in the world today’. With the 
benefit of hindsight Franks’ words seem very prescient regarding the Suez crisis that arose 
during the watch of his successor.  53 
On 28 November Franks and Lady Franks sailed for Britain. Dean Acheson felt ‘real and deep 
regret’ when he first learned of Franks’ departure.  ‘I have greatly enjoyed working with 
him’, he said. ‘His great ability and his keen perception and knowledge of the United States 
and its people have enabled him to carry out his responsibilities with outstanding success’.  
54 American press comment was equally positive, both on the East Coast and elsewhere. The 
New York Times referred to his ‘beautiful and moving farewell to the American people’ as a 
reminder that ‘a good friend and an exceptionally keen mind are being lost – temporarily 
one hopes – to Anglo-American relations’. While The San Francisco Chronicle printed the 
entire text of his farewell address ‘because it is an expression of deep human feeling and 
because as such it manages to clarify and strengthen the bond between the two nations’. 
Clearly Franks would be a hard act to follow. 55 
Sir Roger Makins – Whitehall mandarin, 1953-56  
The man selected for the task of replacing Franks was Sir Roger Makins, who was very much 
a Whitehall mandarin.  Churchill had initially wanted a well-known public figure as 
ambassador along the lines of his choice of the Earl of Halifax – for example, the Earl of 
Mountbatten. But Eden preferred a top-flight official and suggested Makins who had been 
an important figure in the Foreign Office since the 1930s, had already served in the US, had 
an American wife and was generally considered to be an expert in Anglo-American relations. 
By 1952 he was Deputy Undersecretary in the Foreign Office and in line for the top post. 
Churchill also had a high regard for him and, after meeting him over lunch at Cherwell on 20 
July 1952 he agreed to the appointment. Makins eventually departed for the United States  
on 31 December 1952 and as Churchill was anxious to see Truman before he left office the 
new ambassador found himself crossing the Atlantic on the same ship as the Prime Minister, 
arriving in New York on 5 January 1953. 56 
After presenting his credentials to Truman, Makins made his maiden speech to the National 
Press Club at the end of January 1953. Employing a theme that he would return to 
constantly during his time in Washington he expressed confidence that the United States 
and Britain continued to share common objectives despite differences on issues of 
secondary importance.  He warned against disagreements in policy towards the Middle East 
which he said was a vital area for both Britain and the US. He argued that Britain was 
continuing to shoulder most the defence burden in the region and that this was ’in the 
common interest’, not just in Britain’s interest. After his speech he was asked whether he 
thought British and American policies in the Middle East ought to be kept separate, 
especially in Iran, to which he replied, ‘No, I don’t, and especially not in Iran’, stressing the 
strategic importance of the Middle East and its resources to both countries. 57 
A few days later Makins gave the traditional Pilgrims speech at the Waldorf-Astoria. He said 
that the old concept of a close association between Britain and the US as the cornerstone to 
world peace was now broadening to include the entire North Atlantic community, which 
faced the twin task of forging the Atlantic alliance and then ‘fashioning it into something 
greater and more extensive’. He argued that a military alliance kept together by the threat 
of Soviet attack was not enough, ‘there must be something stronger than what Kipling called 
‘’ties of common funk’’, important though these undoubtedly are’.  Anglo—American 
cooperation remained ‘one of the central pillars’ of the Atlantic Alliance, he argued, while 
the traditional relationship was working itself into different patterns ‘in the rolling mill of 
events’ and ‘would endure’. 58  
When Makins made another speech in May 1953, on ‘The British Economy and the Free 
World’, the subsequent Q and A session focused largely on the British Empire in its various 
forms.  Asked when the British Government would ‘modernise its policies towards the 
natives in their colonial empire?’, Makins replied:  ‘it is modernising them all the time’.  He 
then referred to new constitutions in the Gold Coast and Nigeria as well as reforms in the 
West Indian Federation and Malaya. ‘In every colony under the British Crown there is steady 
progress towards self-determination and self-government. That is a continuing process 
which is being carried on in every part of the territories under the British Crown’. He was 
also quizzed about Britain’s informal empire in the Middle East.  ‘Wouldn’t Egypt be better 
off with Britain protecting the Suez Canal, than trying to do it themselves?’, he was asked. ‘I 
regret to say that Egypt doesn’t seem to think so at the moment’, he replied, bringing 
laughter from his audience.  59 
By the summer of 1953 the Eisenhower Administration had decided that the time had come 
to encourage by covert means a new, more compliant regime in Iran. There followed the 
Iranian coup of August 1953 engineered by the CIA and MI6 that overthrew Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddegh and strengthened the rule of the pro-Western Shah, Mohammed 
Reza Pahlavi. However, the coup could not entirely restore the position of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company which changed its name to British Petroleum and joined a consortium of 
companies in controlling Iranian oil output and profits.  The coup suggested that London and 
Washington could work together successfully to further their aims in the Middle East but 
that covert means were preferable to the US government in dealing with obstructionist 
regimes rather than well-publicised military action that might disturb American public 
opinion and provide rhetorical ammunition for the Soviet Union. The same approach was 
used in Guatemala in June 1954. 60 
Further Anglo-American cooperation of a more public kind was evident when Eisenhower 
and Churchill met in Washington in June 1954 - a meeting that led to the so-called Potomac 
Charter which was to some extent a renewal of the Atlantic Charter famously agreed by 
Churchill and Roosevelt in the heady days of August 1941. Upon his return to Britain 
Churchill told the House of Commons that he ‘was thrilled by the wish of the President of 
the United States to bring our two countries so directly together in a new declaration or 
charter, and to revive and renew the comradeship and brotherhood which joined the 
English-speaking world together in the late war, and is now, if carried into effect, the 
strongest hope that all mankind may survive in freedom and justice. I can well understand 
that such a document may incur the criticism of mischief-makers of all kinds in any country, 
but for myself I rejoice to have had the honour of adding my signature to it’. 61 
Like the Atlantic Charter, the Potomac Declaration was couched in general terms and did 
not specifically refer to the Middle East. But Churchill told the Commons that he had raised 
the question of Egypt with the President. ‘I have for some time been of the opinion that the 
United States have a strategic interest in Egypt as well as their interest in the international 
waterway of the Suez Canal and that the responsibility for both these matters should no 
longer be allowed to rest exclusively with Great Britain. Although, of course, the strategic 
importance of Egypt and the Canal has been enormously reduced by modern developments 
of war, it cannot be wholly excluded from American thoughts where the recent extension of 
NATO’s southern flank to Turkey is concerned.’ 62  
Two weeks later, on 27 July 1954, an Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed in Cairo that 
ended the 1936 agreement negotiated when Anthony Eden first became Foreign Secretary 
in Baldwin’s Government. In effect, the new agreement brought to an end over seventy 
years of British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone since the Anglo-Egyptian war of 1882. 
British troops were to leave the Canal Zone by June 1956 although they would still be 
allowed to return in the event of war. The agreement was roundly criticised by some 
Conservative MPs – the so-called Suez Group - as an abandonment of Britain’s imperial 
position but it was successfully defended by Churchill on the grounds not only of cost but 
also the new international security situation that he argued had been created by the 
massive American hydrogen bomb test in March 1954 at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. 
63 
For the remainder of his time as Prime Minister Churchill’s main aim was to fulfil his 
ambition of a summit conference to mitigate the dangers of Cold War misunderstandings 
leading to a nuclear war. Having decided by March 1955 that this would not be possible at 
any early date he informed Eden he would be resigning on 5 April.  But on 8 April a telegram 
from Makins suggested that Eisenhower was thinking of meeting Churchill and other 
Western leaders in Paris on 8 May - the tenth anniversary of VE Day - and might be open to 
planning a conference with the Soviet leadership. This made Churchill withdraw his plan to 
retire in April – much to the annoyance of Eden who pursued the matter with Washington 
via the US ambassador in London rather than Makins in order to clarify Eisenhower’s 
intentions. When the reply came back that the President was not now thinking of going to 
Europe, Churchill duly retired on 5 April. But this was one of a number of incidents that 
caused friction between Eden and his ambassador and led to Makins being recalled during 
the Suez crisis. 64   
Descent to Suez – and ascent to Bermuda, 1956-57  
In his memoir ‘Descent to Suez’, Evelyn Shuckburgh provided historians with an insider’s 
account of the development of the Suez crisis from the advent of Churchill’s peacetime 
government in October 1951, when he was appointed Principal Private Secretary to 
Anthony Eden, to what he described as ‘the morrow of the Suez crisis’ in December 1956. In 
this memoir he naturally focused on the diplomacy of Anthony Eden and the shortcomings 
that led to the crisis, including Eden’s ill-health and increasing irritability and his tendency to 
see Nasser as another Mussolini, but he was also critical of Churchill and of Eden’s ministers. 
As regards the British ambassadors in Washington during this period, while Franks and 
especially Makins were both mentioned quite frequently by Shuckburgh neither was 
afforded a prominent role during the crisis.  65 
In fact, Makins – like Franks - played an important and constructive part in Anglo-American 
relations while he was in Washington and he did his best to keep the Suez crisis from 
spiralling out of control. He got on well with Eisenhower and did his best to smooth over 
difficulties between Washington and London, even urging the Foreign Office to try to 
restrain press criticism of the unpopular Dulles while he was in London for a meeting in 
October 1953. 66 But events were against him, especially in Egypt where the revolution of 
July 1952 which overthrew the monarchy of King Farouk had been stimulated by a 
nationalist movement highly critical of British influence and power in the country. Egyptian 
nationalism was represented most forcefully by Gamal Abdul Nasser who by June 1956 had 
consolidated his hold on the republican government, following the withdrawal of British 
troops from the Suez Canal Zone, by becoming President. Nasser was hostile to the Baghdad 
Pact of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan favoured by Eden and the British Government and 
was prepared to buy arms from the Communist bloc if they could not be obtained from the 
West, hence the arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955. 67 
The dilemma facing Britain and the United States was whether to try to win over Nasser or 
to confront him and secure his removal. The US government was more hopeful than the 
British that the former policy might work and indicated to Nasser that a loan might be made 
to Egypt for the construction of the Aswan High Dam if he was cooperative. Makins played a 
major role in the difficult and complex negotiations to arrange the massive loan required to 
build the dam. 68 But he had lost Eden’s confidence by the time the latter became Prime 
Minister and their relations deteriorated thereafter. Essentially, he was regarded as too 
sympathetic to the American point of view, especially on Middle Eastern issues. He warned 
London that the US Government was opposed to the use of force against Nasser but Eden 
felt he had ‘gone native’ and was therefore not sufficiently forceful in presenting the British 
point of view in Washington. 69 
On 13 July 1956 Dulles told Makins that the US was poised to withdraw the offer of funding 
to Egypt for the Aswan High Dam as Congress was against the idea. The ambassador said 
that the British view was generally supportive of this action but counselled against a blunt 
announcement. It was during these final deliberations on the fate of the Aswan Dam loan 
that on 17 July Dulles was informed that Makins would soon be leaving his Washington post. 
Dulles took this very badly not only because of the timing but also because he had 
‘complete faith’ in Makins. Indeed, the timing could hardly have been worse even though 
the rationale was obviously to remove an ambassador who was regarded as unsympathetic 
to his own Government’s policy. 70 
On 26 July, a week after the US withdrawal of funding from the Aswan Dam project, Nasser 
nationalised the Suez Canal. Eden contacted Eisenhower the next day and appealed for his 
support in putting ‘maximum pressure’ on the Egyptian Government, arguing that Nasser’s 
move threatened both British and US interests in the Middle East.  On the same day, the 
British Cabinet agreed that Britain should act alone if Washington and Paris were not 
prepared to join in common action with London. At the same time, the aim of British policy 
was to try to arrange ‘common action’ with the US and France as their support – and 
especially that of the United States - would be necessary in the event of economic sanctions 
or war. In particular, Britain would have to rely on the US Government to make sure that the 
Soviet Union did not intervene in the situation. 71 
However, despite constant pressure on the US Government and what amounted to a 
propaganda campaign aimed at American public opinion, the British Government was 
unable to make any progress in winning support for the use of force. There was plenty of 
condemnation of Nasser’s action in the United States and some concern at the future 
control of the Canal and the potential for greater Soviet influence in Middle East but very 
little support for military action. Instead, Eisenhower and Dulles favoured a diplomatic 
solution involving the main canal users and the United Nations. A conference of 22 nations 
met in London in August 1956 but neither Nasser nor the British Government was satisfied 
with its results. Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, met Eisenhower in 
Washington on 25 September but he sent back an over-sanguine report of his conversation 
with the President to London. Makins was present at the meeting and later said that he was 
‘amazed’ that neither Macmillan nor Eisenhower had made the positions of their 
governments clear. However, Macmillan also met Dulles who was much clearer in his 
opposition to open military action, preferring to wait until a covert operation could be 
carried out, as in the case of Iran.  72  
Before finally departing from the US in October, Makins gave a farewell speech at a Pilgrims 
lunch in which he said that the Suez Canal question posed ‘the most serious challenge to 
international confidence and good faith since the Korean conflict’. He deprecated what he 
regarded as the tendency to exaggerate disagreements between the US and Britain. ‘We 
appear to have an almost pathological tendency to magnify our differences’, he said. He 
acknowledged that ‘world issues’ had strained Anglo-American relations but he argued that 
‘such disagreement as there is normally relates to the timing and the tactics rather than to 
the substance of policy’. Then, somewhat ironically in view of imminent events, he said: ‘it is 
one of the great strengths of our relationship that when we do disagree we can sit down 
calmly, assess the reasons for it and understand, if we cannot share, each other’s point of 
view’.  73 
Unbeknownst to Makins, who did not discover what was happening until he returned to 
London, the British Government was about to embark on secret negotiations with France 
and Israel in the Parisian suburb of Sèvres – the outcome of which was a plan to seize the 
Canal and to oust Nasser in the process. On 25 October Eden gave the go ahead for British 
military intervention. Israeli forces duly invaded Egypt on 29 October and this was followed 
the next day by a British and French ultimatum to end to the hostilities, which was flatly 
rejected by Nasser.  British planes then attacked Egyptian airfields and British troops headed 
from Malta towards Port Said, which was captured by British and French paratroopers on 5 
November. The main British and French forces arrived at Port Said on 6 November – the day 
of the US Presidential election - and occupied the Canal.  74 
The British and French action was condemned by the US, the Soviet Union and the UN and 
the impact of the crisis on Britain’s fragile financial situation forced Eden to order a rapid 
ceasefire.   Eden’s premiership, of course, never recovered from this humiliating turn of 
events and he resigned through ill-health in January 1957, to be succeeded by Harold 
Macmillan. 75 Ironically, Makins, who was now Joint Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, 
had a major role to play in helping to stabilise sterling after the Suez debacle. In this capacity 
his contribution to Anglo-American relations was perhaps even more important than as 
ambassador in Washington although it was almost unprecedented for a Foreign Service 
official to be given the top job at the Treasury and it was a move that was very controversial 
within Whitehall.  76 
 As for Churchill, he issued a public statement supporting the British military action in which 
he said that Egypt had provoked the crisis and that British policy was intended to restore 
peace to the Middle East. ‘I am convinced that we shall achieve our aim ’, he said, and that 
‘our American friends will come to realise that, not for the first time, we have acted 
independently for the common good’. The statement appeared in the press on 5 November 
and led Eden to write to thank him for his ‘wonderful message’.  Two weeks later, when 
Eden had agreed to withdraw British troops from the Canal Zone, Churchill was asked if he 
would have sent in troops, as Eden had done. ‘I would never have dared’, he replied, ‘and if I 
had dared, I would never have dared stop’. This oft-quoted remark by Churchill suggests 
that he would have been more cautious than Eden in risking American opposition to the use 
of overt military force. And while he sympathised with the Suez Group of MPs he defied 
them over the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in July 1954.  77 
Conclusions  
 
The Potomac Charter of June 1954 was in many ways the fulfilment of Churchill’s mission to 
revive the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ that had been announced by the Atlantic 
Charter of August 1941, forged during the Second World War and enshrined in the Fulton 
speech. The Potomac Declaration not only recognised the common principles underlying 
British and American foreign policies but it did so quite openly. It also inferred the 
containment of the Soviet Union and Communism while acknowledging the primacy of the 
United Nations. It was renewed by Eisenhower and Eden in January 1956 in the Washington 
Declaration and yet in less than a year the US and Britain were at loggerheads and Eden’s 
premiership – and his reputation as a master of diplomacy – had been destroyed by Suez. 78  
Eden and his Cabinet must take much of the blame for this crisis in Anglo-American 
relations. Whereas the Potomac and Washington Declarations, like the original Atlantic 
Charter and, indeed, the Fulton address were well-considered exercises in public diplomacy 
the agreement between Britain, France and Israel at Sèvres was just the opposite – risky, 
secretive and essentially deceitful. The timing of the Israeli invasion of Egypt and the British 
and French intervention – just before the presidential election on 6 November – was also 
the height of folly given the sensitivity of that date from the US perspective. Nasser had 
taken advantage of the pre-election period when nationalising the Suez Canal but close   
allies of the US were not expected to adopt such underhand tactics. The recall of Makins 
during the crisis was also difficult to defend, even if he had lost Eden’s confidence, as it left 
Britain without an ambassador in Washington at a crucial time. 79 
The Eisenhower Administration also came in for its share of criticism during the Suez crisis -
in the US as well as in Britain. Eisenhower’s Democratic opponent in the presidential 
election, Adlai Stevenson, accused him and Dulles of virtually driving the British and French 
into a desperate act because of the lack of clarity in US policy towards Egypt and the Middle 
East – for example, in offering funding for the Aswan High Dam and then withdrawing it. The 
same line was taken by John F. Kennedy, campaigning in New York, and also by George 
Kennan. 80 There was much sympathy for Israel, Britain and France within the US media 
because of Nasser’s own high-handedness and the perceived weakness and unfairness of 
the US response. Walter Lippmann was particularly scathing and in a syndicated column on 
1 November, entitled ‘Disaster in the Middle East’, he accused the Administration of 
treating America’s closest allies with contempt. He argued that a more even-handed US 
response should have been adopted at the UN – recognising Egyptian provocation as well as 
over-reaction by Britain and France. Lippmann was sufficiently influential that his Suez 
column was discussed by Eisenhower and Dulles on the same day. 81 
The Administration took its stand on the issue of colonialism. Vice-President Richard Nixon, 
speaking on the campaign trail, said that the overwhelming support at the UN for the US 
resolution calling upon Britain and France to withdraw their troops from Suez had 
‘constituted a world-wide vote of confidence, the like of which has never been known 
before.... For the first time in history, we have showed independence of Anglo-French 
policies towards Asia and Africa which seemed to us to reflect the colonial tradition’. 82 
More privately, Dulles told the National Security Council that the Suez invasion was ‘the 
straight old-fashioned variety of colonialism of the most obvious sort’. The US had 
endeavoured to retain its good relations with Britain and France while winning over the 
governments of the former colonies and preventing their defection to the Communist bloc. 
But the US could not condone the colonialism of Britain and France otherwise it would be 
tied to the past rather than the future. ‘It was tragic that the US felt compelled to abandon 
its closest long-term allies’, Dulles said, but the alternative was to condone military force to 
restore ‘less developed nations’ to colonial status. 83  
Since the Fulton speech successive British ambassadors had made some headway in 
explaining the nature of the British Commonwealth and Empire to the Americans. The status 
of the Commonwealth was no longer contentious, after the decision of India to remain a 
member after independence and the announcement of the London Declaration of April 
1949 that defined the modern organisation. 84 The development of the colonial empire 
required somewhat more explanation, although an understanding had been reached in the 
Potomac Charter whereby ‘the right of people who are capable of sustaining independence’ 
was recognised. 85 But the third element of British colonialism – the informal empire, most 
notably in the Middle East – had remained a serious problem, a source of weakness as much 
as strength. Eden, fearful that Britain’s entire position in the Middle East was under threat 
from Nasser, including its supply of cheap oil, felt that the Egyptian leader had to be dealt 
with sooner rather than later. But even those Americans who sympathised with Britain’s 
predicament during the Suez crisis, such as Lippmann, did not condone the resort to military 
force. And Kennan characterised it as an ‘ill-conceived and pathetic action’.  86 
After the chastening experience of Suez Churchill was anxious to repair Anglo-American 
relations as quickly as possible and he immediately wrote to Eisenhower to mend the British 
fences. 87 The President was of the same view although he also acted quickly to bolster the 
American position in the Middle East by means of the Eisenhower Doctrine of 5 Jan 1957. 
This gave explicit support to pro-Western nations by committing the US ‘to secure and 
protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such 
aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international 
communism’. 88  
 
Eisenhower then invited Macmillan to a bilateral summit in March and at his suggestion the 
two leaders met in the British colony of Bermuda. Eisenhower later described the Bermuda 
meeting as the most successful international conference he attended after the Second 
World War and it included a significant agreement to supply Britain with intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles. As Eisenhower stepped off the motor launch that took him to the dockside 
where Macmillan was waiting, he thanked the assembled crowd for their warm welcome 
and said: ‘I am sure that in the next few days we can do much to strengthen the long-term 
bonds that have bound together the British Empire and my country’. 89 
 
These words were obviously music to Churchill’s ears and the Bermuda summit helped to 
restore his Fulton dream. The British ambassadors who had served in Washington since the 
Fulton address and, indeed, since Churchill had become Prime Minister, had all contributed 
in their different ways to the development of an Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ that 
was based on national self-interest and genuine cooperation as well as history and culture.  
Taking their lead from Lothian, they had engaged in significant public diplomacy and had 
sought to present a modern and forward-looking image of Britain despite the legacy of 
British colonialism – an image not helped by Churchill’s own attachment to the Empire, both 
formal and informal. Churchill made his final visit to the US in May 1959 achieving his own 
peace with Eisenhower who bid him a friendly farewell as he departed from the White 
House for the last time. The ‘special relationship’ was alive and well but more than ever the 
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